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Abstract 
Treadmill of production (ToP) arguments have significant implications for the 
study of environmental crime. A current limitation of those arguments involves 
their application to environmental law and its enforcement. We argue that a 
treadmill of law (ToL) shapes and maintains production through lawmaking and 
enforcement practices, issues that have yet to receive significant attention in the 
ToP literature. To illustrate the connection between the ToL and ToP and to 
facilitate political economic analysis of this connection, we make and discuss 
three propositions. In particular, we suggest that the ToL will (1) oppose the 
enhancement of environmental regulation through acts of state corporate crime, 
if necessary; (2) fail to enforce criminal laws in ways that would alter production 
practices; and (3) define intense opposition to ToP interests and actors as 
criminal. 
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Introduction 
Critical scholars have documented the tendency for environmental laws to reflect and 
reproduce powerful economic interests (Barnett 2000; Faber 2008; Gonzalez 2004; 
Pearce and Tombs 1998; Szasz 1986). These critical observations about law are 
consistent with the notion of a treadmill of production (or ToP), or the idea that 
“economic criteria remain the foundation of [environmental] decision making” 
(Schnaiberg, Pellow, Weinberg 2002, 16). We extend the ToP perspective to draw 
attention to the ways the law contributes to shaping and maintaining powerful 
economic interests through environmental lawmaking and enforcement practices. We 
refer to this practice as the treadmill of law (or ToL). This issue—how environmental 
laws can also be used to maintain the ToP—has yet to receive sufficient attention by 
critical scholars. To frame our arguments we begin with a review of ToP. Next, we lay 
out our conceptualization of the ToL and present three basic propositions central to 
establishing a ToL. 
Treadmill of Production 
Schnaiberg (1980) developed the ToP thesis in The Environment: From Surplus to 
Scarcity. He argues that ecological systems contain an energy production and 
management system that creates and directs the flow of energy through processes 
such as photosynthesis and the conversion of expended animal and plant life into 
carbon stores. At some point humans discovered how to transform energy stored in 
fossil fuels into usable energy to run their economy. While all economies rely on 
energy, the use of energy in capitalist production is influenced by capitalism’s primary 
objective: its quest for profit (Marx [1867] 1976). Under capitalism producers can 
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increase profit by expanding production, selling more products and/or by reducing 
labor costs. Significant ecological consequences result from these pursuits (Foster, 
Clark, and York 2010). For instance, firms can accomplish the above by increasing 
energy consumption or the use of chemical technology to enhance mass production 
and bring labor costs down. This is at least one of the ways the history of energy use 
and class conflict under capitalism appear (Foster, Clark, and York 2010). Adding to our 
admittedly simplified summary of capitalism, and drawing on Schnaiberg (1980), 
intensified use of fossil fuel and chemical energy to expand production and reduce 
labor costs is a key feature of post-WWII capitalism, or of the capitalist treadmill of 
production. 
Schnaiberg (1980, 228–229) argues that the normal operation of capitalism 
generates significant levels of “conflict” between ecology and the economy. That is, 
production accelerates under capitalism and therefore demands greater resource 
extraction (i.e., withdrawals) and pollution (i.e., additions). Importantly, expansion of 
production results in ecological disorganization, a condition that exists when humans 
access energy organized in the environment in ways that prevent the sustainability of 
ecosystems and the biosphere. The contradiction between capitalism and nature has 
been extensively analyzed by critical scholars (e.g. Boyce 2002; Burkett 1999; Clark and 
Foster 2009; Foster 2000; 2005; Foster and Clark 2009; Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 
2008; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; O’Connor 1998, 1994; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994; 
York 2004). As Magdoff and Foster (2011, 43) point out, “capitalism recognizes no 
limits to its own self-expansion—there is no amount of profit, no amount of wealth, 
and no amount of consumption that is either enough or too much.” Given the conflict 
between capitalism and nature, the cost of expanding capitalist production is a 
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constantly increased pace of ecological withdrawals and additions. We will argue that 
this conflict between capitalism and nature also drives what we call the treadmill of 
law (ToL). The ToL helps to enable the expansion of the ToP and therefore exists 
structurally as part of the organization of capitalism. As we will demonstrate, however, 
conflicting subjectivities can influence the ToL through agency. 
Treadmill of Law 
Schnaiberg’s (1980) theory sets the stage for arguing that a ToL exists and aids the 
state in supporting the ToP through the state’s own criminal activities and its 
construction and enforcement of environmental regulations. For instance, Schnaiberg 
(130) suggests the state creates policies that direct economic investment and tax 
incentives toward science and technological innovations that enhance manufacturing 
and agricultural production without considering the ecological costs of those policies. 
He also notes that despite the tendency of environmental law to expand, substantial 
variation in these regulations exists across nations and time that aids the expansion of 
the ToP. These observations provide the context in which to examine how the ToP 
influences ToL definitions of crime, the enforcement of environmental laws, and how 
the ToL thus feeds back into the ToP. 
The concept of the ToL is an extension of ToP theory. The phrase “treadmill of 
law” is employed here specifically to refer to the ways in which environmental laws 
and regulations reflect and reinforce economic relations that legitimize and replicate 
ToP practices, relationships, and interests, and contribute to expansion of the ToP. This 
understanding of the ToL is an extension of the general materialist explanation of law 
(see e.g. Pashukanis [1924] 2007). We follow ToP scholars closely in their suggestion 
6 
 
that there are three major sets of actors in the ToL. First, there are producers 
responsible for ecological disorganization through ecological withdrawals and 
additions. Producers often employ lobbyists and fund interest groups to represent 
their material interests when it comes to the formation of environmental law and 
regulation. Second, there are various state officials and representatives who influence, 
create and enforce environmental laws and regulations. Finally, there are citizens and 
citizens groups who often call for environmental protection. These three major sets of 
actors are often in conflict over the form and shape of environmental laws and their 
enforcement. 
Drawing from ToP theory, we also suggest that the ToL can be described using 
three general propositions that make up the focus of this analysis. These propositions 
tend to be stringent, meaning that they tend to insulate the law from dramatic change 
and that the structure of the ToL will create a long-term affinity to protect ToP 
interests over public and ecological health interests. These propositions are based on 
general observations about the ToP and its actors (treadmill organizations, labor, state, 
environmental groups and organizations) developed by Schnaiberg (1980; see also 
Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Building upon 
observations that the ToL reinforces the ToP, we argue that producers oppose 
environmental regulations, including criminal regulations, which place constraints on 
production and accumulation. Because the ToP favors an unregulated free market and 
capital accumulation over other outcomes (e.g. environmental protection), treadmill 
actors attempt to employ the ToL to oppose both more stringent environmental 
regulations and efforts to define ecological disorganization as a crime (see e.g. Lynch 
et al. 2013) to protect their economic interests. 
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Proposition 1: The ToL will oppose (through state-corporate crime, if necessary) 
enhancements of environmental regulations that criminalize ecologically 
destructive behaviors of the ToP and its agents 
As noted above, under capitalism production generally expands (Schnaiberg 1980). The 
law plays a crucial role in this expansion. Defining ecological withdrawals and additions 
as non-harmful and/or non-criminal is central to the ToL. As Schnaiberg, Pellow and 
Weinberg (2002, 24) have already suggested, “treadmill organizations generally resist 
environmental regulation with all the substantial means at their disposal.” As a result, 
producers spend “many of their environmental dollars on fighting regulation” (Porter 
and van der Linde 1995, 128). More recently, some companies are even openly 
refusing to obey agreements with environmental regulators. For instance, Devon 
Energy (a company in Oklahoma, USA) has stated it will no longer (1) honor a previous 
commitment to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) to reduce 
environmental pollution through the implementation of industry standard technology 
and (2) invest in a supplemental environmental projects to mitigate environmental 
damage (Tabuchi and Lipton 2017). Devon’s reasoning is that production is declining, 
and obeying regulation is harmful to their bottom line. 
The law also helps justify and reinforce production by devaluing harm caused 
by chemical-based production while reinforcing orthodox definitions of crime. For 
instance, lawyers for Dow Chemical (which donated significant funds to President 
Trump’s political campaign) sent a letter to the Trump administration asking them to 
downplay recent government studies demonstrating the risks of major pesticides used 
in industrial agriculture production (Mukherjee 2017). 
State actors also support production by resisting expansion of criminal 
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environmental laws through state-corporate relationships that manipulate the law to 
avoid the application of criminal labels. This can also include engaging in behaviors 
criminologists define as state-corporate crime or as “[i]llegal or socially injurious 
actions that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal 
in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and 
distribution” (Kramer and Michalowski 1990, 4). This definition can be used to show 
how producers engage in behaviors that can be defined as criminal. For instance, 
Kramer, Michalowski and Kauzlarich (2002) argue that sometimes state-corporate 
crimes occur when governments fail to prevent deviant business practices from 
promoting economic growth. This argument has been applied to analyses of how 
state-corporate interests affected US climate change regulations (Kramer 2013; Lynch, 
Burns, and Stretesky 2010). Because capitalism is based on accumulation that is often 
situated in production, constant economic growth and expanded natural resource 
extraction, state-corporate crimes that facilitate ToP expansion will often emerge. 
Thus, for instance, President Trump’s recent actions to withdraw the US from the Paris 
climate accord on account of its being damaging to domestic production could be 
defined as an act of state-corporate crime (Liptak and Acosta 2017). 
State-corporate crime perspectives also suggest that political economic 
organization facilitates corporate access to political resources that in turn shape the 
construction and enforcement of environmental law and engagement in ecological 
harm. For instance, Lynch, Burns and Stretesky (2010) examined the politics of global 
warming during the George W. Bush administration. During Bush’s presidency, high-
ranking White House officials held secret meetings with representatives of the fossil 
fuel, energy, and chemical sectors to shape US environmental policies. When these 
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secret meetings were revealed Congress investigated and demanded that the White 
House adhere to public law concerning the conduct of policy meetings (Lynch, Burns, 
and Stretesky 2010). Vice President Dick Cheney was ordered to make his private 
meeting notes public, a legally enforceable request he refused during his entire stay in 
office (Lynch, Burns, and Stretesky 2010). These secret energy meetings demonstrate 
how producers, as ToL actors in the energy sector, engage lawmakers to normalize 
ecological harms created during production and keep their actions from being defined 
as criminal (Chambliss 1989; Fagin and Lavelle 1996). 
With respect to the social construction of state-corporate environmental crime, 
there are at least four additional mechanisms that characterize ToL’s opposition to the 
criminalization of producer-polluters. These include: (1) challenging scientific evidence, 
by asserting that the harms claims offered by scientific studies are flawed and cannot 
be used to draw conclusions that would inform the lawmaking process (Markowitz and 
Rosner 2003); (2) economic protectionist arguments legitimized by law which claim, 
for example, that proposed environmental regulations will promote social problems 
such as reduced economic growth, spurring unemployment and inflation (Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen 1990); (3) arguments that in a free market regulation is unnecessary 
because  the market provides corrective mechanisms that ensure environmental 
protection (Fagin and Lavelle 1996); and (4) the idea that no “crime” has actually 
occurred because the harmful acts do not meet the burden of proof required to set 
the law in motion. In these ways a ToL that helps protect the ToP is generated. 
In short, actors and representatives of the polluter industrial complex influence 
the definition of environmental/green crime by engaging with lawmakers and 
enforcement personnel. Importantly, however, definitions of crime and harm are 
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contested and do change over time, that is, the ToL is constantly shaped and reshaped 
by conflicts between producers, lawmakers and citizens. For example, Faber (2008, 5–
7) details how the public’s demand for a clean environment led to a dramatic increase 
in the adoption of federal environmental laws and regulation during the 1970s. 
Importantly, Faber suggests that some of these protections mandated that producers 
implement technology to make production less harmful. Nevertheless, many socially 
disadvantaged segments of society (i.e., working class, poor and minority 
communities) did not benefit from this new wave of environmental protection (Faber 
2008, 10), since the implementation or enforcement of environmental law reflected 
power arrangements that allowed production to continue while protecting the more 
privileged members of US society in the process. More recently there has been a 
backlash against environmental regulation that developed in the 1970s and producers 
have been seeking to repeal or replace these “outdated” laws with neoliberal 
environmental policies. These new laws and regulations are to ensure the expansion of 
production in the modern era under free market ideology. For example, when George 
W. Bush was the Governor of Texas, he signed a law drafted largely by industry that 
allowed for voluntary participation in pollution reduction (Yardley 1999). The law was 
a direct result of concern by Texas industry (for example Exxon and Marathon Oil) that 
pending environmental legislation would mandate that companies adopt cleaner 
production practices in outdated industrial plants. Thus, rather than rely on 
government regulation that may define them as “criminal” or “deviant,” producers 
often advocate for self-policing arguing, instead, that they are good environmental 
stewards. 
11 
 
Proposition 2: The state’s enforcement of criminal environmental laws will not 
change production trends or limit ToP expansion 
In the orthodox view it is generally assumed that the purpose of law, whether criminal 
or regulatory, is to control adverse outcomes and change the behavior of individuals 
and entities engaged in harmful activities. To accomplish that outcome, orthodox 
theory often argues in favor of the use of law and its enforcement to deter criminal 
behavior. Even the US EPA assumes that more stringent environmental law and law 
enforcement deter environmental criminal behavior. 
Here the question is whether the ToL changes the trajectory of the ToP by 
creating and enforcing environmental laws (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013a). On this 
point Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg (2008, 68) suggest that “[p]olicy interventions can 
… generate incentives for some alteration of technological trajectories, and may 
preclude some forms of production,” meaning sometimes the law confines production. 
This occurs to the extent that the state is a meaningful location of class struggle over 
ecological disorganization played out in the creation and enforcement of laws 
(Schnaiberg 1980). In theory strict environmental laws can decelerate the ToP when 
the state and environmental enforcement agencies effectively represent the public’s 
interest in maintaining environmental health (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). 
In contrast, we suggest that the ToL will only challenge production through the 
application of criminal sanctions when infamous ecological events perceived to have 
serious ecological consequences are punished. When well-known environmental 
disasters become the focus of public scrutiny, criminal law is likely to become relevant 
and there may be public pressure to apply it to treadmill actors who contributed to the 
disaster. For example, the United States Department of Justice charged two British 
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Petroleum employees with manslaughter for their perceived role in the Deepwater oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Grimm 2015; Milman 2015). Those charges appealed to the 
public’s dislike for BP. As Bell (2012) laments, “A catastrophe of this magnitude should 
change a company forever” (emphasis added). The question, however, is: “Does 
punishment and social condemnation really change the behavior of the offender and 
other producers in a way that reduces ecological disorganization?” On this point we 
suggest that criminal law does little, if anything, to change production, a point 
supported by the limited empirical evidence addressing this question (Stretesky, Long, 
and Lynch 2013a). We therefore suggest that the ToL will not change the ToP’s normal 
operation and development.  
This role of the ToL in maintaining production and its inability to alter the ToP 
even in times of severe ecological destruction are facilitated by conflicting roles of the 
state. That is, the state, given its structural connection to the ToP and the public, must 
balance its efforts to produce and reinforce the ToL to protect the public’s interest in 
environmental protection and public health with its interest in generating conditions 
for economic expansion to support the ToP (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008). As 
an example of these later interests, under existing environmental policy-making and 
some environmental laws lawmakers are required to address economic considerations 
when modifying the ToL to protect treadmill organization and economic growth 
interests. Illustrating that point, the phrase “economic assessment” occurs 1,210 times 
on the US EPA website. In the United Kingdom the Environment Agency (2010, 16) 
states, “As part of contributing to economic prosperity, we work with policy makers 
and planning authorities to encourage economic regeneration and development that 
can be sustained within environmental limits.” Thus, state agents may represent both 
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sides in an environmental struggle, which can also lead to conflicts between state 
agencies on specific environmental policies or regulations (Merry 2006), shaping the 
outcome of a ToL conflict. On this point it should be noted that individual lawmakers 
may also oppose enforcement against treadmill organizations to whom they are 
connected. Lawmakers are not a unified, homogeneous group, and structural interests 
in maintaining production may shape whether they endeavor to influence the ToL. 
Importantly, empirical evidence specifically suggests that criminal enforcement 
does little to change the pollution practices of treadmill actors. Stretesky, Long and 
Lynch (2013a; see also Long et al. 2012 and Stretesky et al. 2017) examined the 
influence of enforcement efforts against producers to determine whether 
punishments reduced future pollution emissions. They found that the correlation 
between penalties and toxic releases is weak at best, suggesting that penalties do little 
to alter ToP practices. This means that the ToL is currently ineffective at slowing the 
ToP in any meaningful way, an explanation of which can be situated in political ecology 
literature connecting capitalism and accumulation (Foster 2000). In that context, the 
ToL reinforces the profit/production/expansion objectives of capitalism over the 
preservation of nature. In the modern world, where capitalism and the capitalist ToP 
have become ubiquitous and developed into a worldwide system of production, these 
political economic forces may also influence the development and application of 
international environmental law. 
In sum, in a capitalist free market system characterized by unequal ownership 
and accumulation along with constantly expanding production the following holds 
true: (1) the structure of the ToL will tend to reinforce the political economic 
organization of capitalism; (2) many ToP behaviors that promote ecological 
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disorganization will be excluded from or only partially addressed in the ToL; (3) 
enforcement of ToL environmental laws will be shaped by political economic 
relationships and class conflict; while (4) enforcement of ToL environmental laws will 
fail to constrain expansion of the ToP or ecologically destructive ToP behaviors. 
Proposition 3: Actors who threaten the ToP are likely to be defined as “green” 
deviants and criminals 
Opposition to ToP practices has emerged across the globe as environmental 
organizations monitor environmental crimes, help enforce environmental laws and call 
upon the state to enforce those laws. Some argue these activities possess the potential 
to shift power away from treadmill organizations to environmental organizations 
(Bondaroff 2011; Kinchy and Perry 2012; Overdevest and Mayer 2008). Gould, 
Schnaiberg and Weinberg (1996, 10 and Chapter 5) suggested that political resistance, 
though faced with numerous political challenges, can “alter the environmental impacts 
of the newer globally tilted treadmill” and provide a “pervasive challenge to the 
nation-state.” Opposition to the ToP comes in various forms represented by, for 
example, independent scientists, government scientists, scientists and activists 
employed by NGO environmental organizations, locally affected populations that 
sometimes form grassroots organizations, and national or regional social movement 
organizations that have already formed to engage in environmental struggles (Bullard 
2000; Cole and Foster 2001). Treadmill actors, however, oppose political resistance 
from the environmental movement. This opposition comes in the form of counter-
movements (Rowell 1996), and this has implications for the ToL and its relationship to 
defining and enforcing environmental regulation. As noted, the law will tend to 
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reinforce production and define behavior that could potentially disrupt production as 
criminal. There are many instances where treadmill actors and the state use the law to 
constrain pro-environmental behavior by individuals and organizations. The strategic 
lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is one such tool in the ToL. A SLAPP is 
unlikely to be successful in court. Instead, the purpose of a SLAPP is to threaten and 
intimidate activists so that they do not challenge ecologically destructive behavior 
(Norman 2010). Hurley and Shogren (1996) explain that the average SLAPP is 
approximately 7.4 million dollars, takes an average of three years to resolve, and are 
filed by a variety of developers and industries against individual activists and 
environmental organizations. For example, Hurley and Shogren (1996) describe how a 
major U.S. coal company successfully used a SLAPP against a blueberry farmer who 
filed a water pollution complaint with the US EPA against the company. The farmer did 
not have the resources to pursue the complaint as a result of this particular corporate 
legal tactic. In Canada mining companies have started legal proceedings against 
environmental organizations for publishing claims that a gold and copper mine could 
destroy a nearby lake. Referring to the SLAPP, a representative from the nonprofit 
organization stated that “its main goal is to not only put a chill on our organization, but 
to send a message to all citizens that if you comment on this project, you could very 
well likely receive papers in the mail and have to spend considerable time and 
resources defending yourself.” Governments have also criminalized and restricted 
certain pro-environmental movements, policy and research. In 2015 in Florida 
Governor Rick Scott banned state agencies from using the term “climate change,” 
“global warming” and “sustainability” (McCarthy 2015). In 2010 Virginia’s Attorney 
General, Ken Cuccinelli, twice attempted to initiate a civil investigation of renowned 
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climatologist Michael E. Mann for fraud when applying for funds to conduct climate 
change research (Rudolf 2011). 
More central to the ToL, however, is the use of criminal labels to draw 
attention to individuals and groups who oppose ToP-effected ecological destruction. 
For instance, the ToL has created a special category of offenses (i.e., “eco-crimes”) and 
offenders (i.e., “eco-terrorists”) for actors who resist ecologically destructive practices, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has used its anti-terrorism unit to label and 
investigate “eco-terrorists,” including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. 
These labels started to emerge shortly after the rise of the modern environmental 
movement (Smith 2008). In a 2002 testimony before the United States House 
Resources Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, James Jarboe, the Domestic 
Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation suggested that  
 
Since 1977, when disaffected members of the ecological preservation group 
Greenpeace formed the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and attacked commercial 
fishing operations by cutting drift nets, acts of “eco-terrorism” have occurred around 
the globe. The FBI defines eco-terrorism as the use or threatened use of violence of a 
criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, 
subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience 
beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature. 
 
Thus, over time, individuals and organizations that attempt to stop harmful 
environmental behavior in unconventional ways have been described as eco-terrorists. 
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What is clear is that the law has been used to legitimize the use of this term and has 
expanded eco-terrorism laws and punishments in an effort to constrain resistance 
against ecological disorganization (Nilson and Burke 2002). However, pro eco-
terrorism definitions have not gone unchallenged. As Smith (2008, 537) noted, the 
label eco-terrorist is inappropriate because it “stifles political dissent and is being used 
as a pretext to ensure the protection of private economic gains.” Nevertheless, actors 
opposing the ToP have become increasingly subject to expansion of the ToL in ways 
that protect the accumulation of capital. Applying criminal and terrorist labels to pro-
environmental actors allows the state to control them through violence, if necessary. 
As a result, Global Witness (2014) suggests that state- and corporate-sponsored 
murders of environmental activists are increasing. In support of these anti-eco-
terrorism ToL initiatives the media reports thousands of eco-terrorist acts annually 
(Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde 2014), while some scholars note an increase in pro-
environmental military activism by environmental movements and environmental 
NGOs (Azmi 2013, 1). These statements serve to remind us that the ToL directs 
attention away from the ToP and back to more orthodox crimes. 
Conclusion 
Foster (2000) has argued that the normal operation of capitalism is in direct conflict 
with ecosystem and human health. We suggest that the ToP generates substantial 
ecological disorganization that can be defined as “green crimes” (Lynch et al. 2013). 
The ecologically destructive effects of the ToP have drawn significant attention 
following Schnaiberg’s (1980) introduction of that concept, leading many to focus on 
the connection between the continuous expansionary drives of capitalism and the 
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expansion of ecological destruction. To date, however, ToP research on the 
interrelationship between the ToP and law has been limited. Here we have examined 
the connection between production and the law in what we refer to as the ToL. 
The ToL is shaped by the conflict between capitalism and ecology, and by ToL-
related socio-political conflicts between scientists, policy-makers and ToP actors, as 
illustrated, for example, in the contested illness literature (Brown, Morello-Frosch, and 
Zavestoski 2012) and even in conflicts between various environmental activists (Taylor 
2000). Those contests/conflicts are shaped above all else by the structural imperatives 
of economic expansion under capitalism, because, as Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 
(2002, 5) remind us, “public institutions [are] developed by the state to facilitate 
economic growth.” 
Here we have formulated three basic propositions concerning the relationship 
between the ToL and ToP which can be expanded upon and investigated further to 
examine how environmental laws and regulations become their own treadmill that 
reinforces the ToP to ensure that the process of accumulation is not disrupted. This 
framework suggests that the emergence of a ToL largely maintains the status quo of 
production and facilitates the expansion of production and ecological disorganization. 
The ToL accomplishes this by reinforcing minimal environmental regulations that allow 
polluters to avoid being criminalized, limiting the enforcement of environmental 
regulations and imposing but a few weak punishments on corporate environmental 
violators, as well as by creating a special criminal category for those who oppose 
ecologically destructive behaviors of production. 
Certainly, there numerous conflicts arising in socio-political conflicts monitored 
by the environmental ToL that shape its path for which we have yet to account. For 
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instance, treadmill actors may have competing interests with other treadmill actors, 
adding a dimension of economic struggle to ToL conflicts that requires additional 
analysis (Clapp 2010; Markussen and Svendsen 2005). Moreover, the number of 
competing interests is affected by the nature of the ToL conflict (e.g. whether it is 
local, national, or regional). In short, the exact context of any given ToL environmental 
conflict will affect how treadmill actors behave in particular situations, what the tools 
they employ, what alliances they form (Jessop 1993), and how the ToL conflict ends. In 
general, however, ToL conflicts will be shaped by structural factors related to the 
organization of capitalism.  
Our argument suggests that the ToL restricts environmental policy in ways that 
favor ToP interests over public and environmental health interests, although not 
always. As a result, a ToL approach can be used to explain the lack of officially state-
labeled environmental crime and deviance among treadmill organizations, and to shed 
light on why the state supports the ToP by resisting efforts to define “green” crime as 
“acts that cause significant harm to ecological systems for the purposes of 
accumulation” (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). As noted, this approach requires 
social scientists to reorient their thinking about the definition of crime away from state 
definitions and toward harms-based and even scientific definitions of ecological harm. 
Such explanations reveal biases in environmental lawmaking and the application of 
environmental laws and regulations, and draws attention instead to the ways in which 
capitalism causes significant ecological harm and is aided by the organization and 
application of the ToL. Importantly, our argument draws attention to the ways the law 
contributes to shaping and maintaining the production through environmental 
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lawmaking and enforcement practices, issues that have yet to receive significant 
attention in the ToP literature. 
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